

# On the Determination of the Mind

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## INTRODUCTION

David Hume is the most influential philosopher of empiricism. Most modern philosophical discussions are related to Hume's philosophy in some way. This paper is an attempt to investigate Hume's theory of causation and examine the relationship between a determination of the mind and necessity—in—objects. In inquiring into Hume's theory of causation, our main concern will be directed to the problems of how the determination of the mind is exerted, whether or not necessity—in—objects exists. The definition of causation is the subject matter of Section I and the existence of necessary connection is the subject matter of Section II. Section III is the consequence of Section I and Section II.

It is widely agreed that Hume was a negative philosopher. In the *History of Western Philosophy*, Bertrand Russell wrote:

David Hume (1711~76) is one of the most important among philosophers, because he developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley and by making itself consistent made it incredible. He represents, in a certain sense, a dead end: in his direction, it is impossible to go further.<sup>1</sup>

His theory is the culminating point in empiricism. 'A dead end' signifies a condition in which that philosophy is brought to a deadlock. It is difficult to refute or accept his sceptical conclusion. Hume thought as follows:

"No one can once doubt but existence and non-existence destroy each other, and are perfectly incompatible and contrary."<sup>2</sup>

In other words, both cannot be true simultaneously. Both cannot be compatible. When one of two things is chosen, one is to be true. Here is an alternative. If one of two things is taken, one must be true and the other must be false. This view is also a sort of dualism which presupposes both opposites and regards one as true and the other as false. Nevertheless, one sided philosophical theory cannot assert without falling to destroy itself. The ultimate empiricism comes to a dead end. Hume's theory is so complete that no one can refute it. Hume proved the superiority of empiricism over rationalism. Nevertheless, his argument is based on a dualistic view of presupposing both opposites. The empirical cannot be proved by the empirical itself. The ultimate empiricism must be proved by something not based on experience.

However, are two opposing standpoints indispensable for philosophical inquiry? Can existence and non-existence not be compatible? Must alternative ways of thinking be requisite?

In the East, there is another different view from dualism. It is a monistic view of not presupposing both opposites. In Taoism, Lao Tzu said:

"Existence and non-existence give birth each other"<sup>3</sup>

In other words, existence and non-existence<sup>4</sup> do not destroy each other. Existence and non-existence are not incompatible. Thus, both are interdependent. If existence and non-existence do not complement each other, existence and non-existence cannot give birth each other. Tao possesses the two aspects of Yin and Yang.<sup>5</sup> To Lao Tzu, Tao is the Way of nature. Mind and matter are not separated. Tao unifies both

opposites into a larger reality encompassing both opposites.<sup>6</sup> One includes the other. The other includes one. Lao Tzu believed, for instance, 'good' and 'bad' are part of Tao. Then 'good' and 'bad' are not separated. Goodness turns out to be evil. Thus both opposites are interchangeable. Lao Tzu speaks of Tao as beyond dichotomy between one and the other. Then wisdom of Lao Tzu lies in what is beyond opposition. Do existence and non-existence destroy each other? Are existence and non-existence incompatible with each other? No, we can find the notion of interdependence there. There is a sort of monism — a monistic view of not presupposing both opposites.

Next, let us consider Kitaro Nishida<sup>7</sup> who is the most important philosopher in modern Japan, maintaining the logic of 'sokuhi':

A is A

yet A is non-A

therefore A is A<sup>8</sup>

In other words A is non-A. Non-A is A. Existence is non-existence, Non-existence is existence. The logic of 'sokuhi' is the simultaneous assertion of 'is' and 'is not'. The positive is the negative. The negative is the positive. The logic of 'sokuhi' is the absolute identification of the 'is' and the 'is not'. This is the world of contradictory self-identities. The world cannot be viewed in two directions. The logic of the 'is' and the 'is not' of a thing is the oneness of the 'is' and the 'is not'. There is a sort of monism — a monistic view of not presupposing both opposites. In *Fundamental Problems of Philosophy*, Nishida wrote:

Reality is both being and non-being; it is being-*qua*-non-being and non-being-*qua*-being. It is both subjective and objective, both *nóesis* and *nóema*. Subjectivity and objectivity are absolutely opposed, but reality is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, i.e., the self-identity of the absolute opposition.<sup>9</sup>

Lastly, let us consider *Prajuñā Pāramitā Sūtras*<sup>10</sup> in Buddhism

'form here is emptiness, and emptiness indeed is form. emptiness is not different from form, form is not different from emptiness.'<sup>11</sup>


In other words, form is no form. Here is no dualism. Reality arises out of a source that cannot be described either being or non-being, form or no form. The twoness of form and emptiness is the oneness.<sup>12</sup> The oneness is the whole in which all reality is subsumed.

Form and emptiness are opposites. Nevertheless, the relationship between form and emptiness is interdependent, complementary and interchangeable. If one takes one of the two, one is apt to regard the one as absolute. If one excludes the other, one is apt to regard the one as the whole. An assertion of one side over the other side loses its foundation. Thus the two sides cannot be considered separated and unrelated.<sup>13</sup> This is the logic of interdependency.

Well then, how can we propound the compatibility of both opposites? A thing always has two sides, the positive and the negative. When one talks about the negative, the positive is missing. Still this is dualistic. When one talk about the positive, the negative is missing. Also this is a dualistic understanding. Thus, one is liable to be involved in dualism. Then it is difficult to accept things as they are. It is hard to take a monistic view of not presupposing both opposites. Whether or not one

has a problem in philosophical issues depends upon one's attitude. If one has a dualistic view of presupposing both opposites, there would be a problem. If one has a monistic view of not presupposing both opposites, there would be no problem.

As far as Hume's official theory of causation is concerned, necessity does not exist in objects or nature, but exists in the mind. That is to say, necessity is synonymous with the determination on the mind, namely, necessity—in—mind. But if we admit necessity—in—objects, conceptual perplexities will be resolved in the following Sections by the logic of interdependency. In Section I we can find interdependency between  $Df_1$  and  $Df_2$  and complementarity between  $Df_1$  and  $Df_2$ . In Section II we can find that the negative aspect of causality and the positive aspect are interdependent on each other. Also we can find that no necessary connection turns into necessary connection, and so, no necessary connection and necessary connection are interchangeable.



Since we have discovered the logic of interdependency in Section I and II, Hume should have provided necessity—in—objects and necessity—in—mind with the logic of interdependency. Section III is the consequent part of Section I and Section II. Even if my objective is to give a new interpretation of Hume's notion of causation and reconstruct a theory, conversely, Hume's theory will provide us with a renewed interpretation of Hume's notion of causation, after exploring Hume's own logic.<sup>14</sup> This attempt will make us find necessity—in—objects which supports necessity—in—mind, and propose a possible way of renewing a theory in the context of Hume's own philosophy.

## Section I :Two Definitions of Causation

According to Hume, the definition of causation is given in two ways: one is defined in terms of philosophical relation, namely from a standpoint of ' comparison ', the other one is defined in terms of natural relations, namely, from a standpoint of 'an association between two ideas'.

A cause in philosophical relation is:

Df<sub>1</sub>.....an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter<sup>15</sup>

A cause in natural relation is:

Df<sub>2</sub>.....an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.<sup>16</sup>

It is important to grasp the significance of these definitions in order to understand Hume's theory of causation. Hume's theory of causation is an analysis of the causal rela

tion. Nevertheless, Hume's two definitions have produced philosophical polemic. These two definitions do not seem to be equivalent when one reads as follows:

Thus tho' causation be a philosophical relation, as implying contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction, yet 'tis only so far as it is a natural relation, and produces an union among our ideas, that we are able to reason upon it, or draw any inference from it.<sup>17</sup>

The first definition mentions about contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction. The second definition mentions about something that happens in the mind. Hence, the conditions expressed in the first definition are not the same as the conditions expressed in the second definition.

There are some different views on these two definitions. J.A.Robinson argues that the two definitions are neither intentionally nor extensionally equivalent. The first definition is, for J.A.Robinson, Hume's true theory of causation.<sup>18</sup> A.Flew maintains that Hume banishes the notion of necessity from his definition of causation.

For another example, D.Gotterbarn claims that the two definitions are not intentionally but extensionally equivalent. A determination of the mind is required by the first definition. Norman Kemp Smith holds that Hume is no supporter of what is meant by the 'uniformity' view of causation. We distinguish between mere sequence and causal sequence, and what differentiates the two is that the idea of necessiation (determination) enters into the latter as a quite essential element.

Thus, there seems to be two main different views on this subject: The claim that the first definition is the only true definition and the second definition is mistakenly referred to by Hume as as a definition; the other claim is that the second definition is the only true definition and the first definition is mistakenly referred to by Hume as a definition. J.A.Robinson's view and Antony Flew's view belong to the former view: D.Gotterbarn's view and Norman Kemp Smith's view belong to the latter view.

However, Hume's writings provides no basis on which to judge either of the two



definitions as deeper or more important. Hume was committed to both different definitions of causation and gave them compatibility. Hume described:

There may two definitions be given of this relation, which are only different, by their presenting a different view of *the same object*<sup>19</sup>

If it were not  $Df_1$ ,  $Df_2$  could not be established. If it were not  $Df_2$ ,  $Df_1$  could not be established. Although Hume began with his dualism, the conclusion of definition about causation was committed to a sort of monism.  $Df_1$  and  $Df_2$  complement each other. In *the Enquiry*, too, Hume remarked that causation is defined from two different lights

There is a symbolic instance of light. We can find complementarity both in Hume's definitions of causation and in definitions of light. Is light composed of waves or particles? Wave idea and particle idea are conceptual opposites. Then the choice between waves and particles is exclusive. One cannot describe exclusively in either wave or particulate terms. Those examples were discovered in phenomena. The alternative ways of thinking are impossible. The undulatory theory of light and the corpuscular theory of light are complementary.

Therefore we can find interdependency in each case.

## Section II: No Necessary Connection and Necessary Connection

In the previous section Hume established the two definitions for causation. Hume defined about an object in the first definition and about the idea of an object in the second definition. What is noteworthy is the notion of contiguity and succession. Contiguity and succession are essential for causation in both definitions. An object *e* is contiguous to an object *c*. An object *c* is followed by an object *e*. That is to say, two objects are contiguous to each other and one follows after another. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded that two objects are causally related to each other. Hume contended that all perceptions are independent beings. So, these two perceptions of two objects exist independently of each other. The conditions of contiguity and successions are not enough to establish causation. In order for *c* to be the cause of *e*, another condition must be added to the condition of contiguity and succession. Hume noted:

There is a NECESSARY CONNECTION to be taken into consideration, and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention'd <sup>20</sup>

Hume thought that necessary connection is more important for the idea of causation. Then what is the nature of necessary connection?

Here again I turn the objects on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this necessary connexion, and find the impression, or impressions, from which its idea may be deriv'd,

when I cast my eye on the *known qualities* of objects. I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not the least on them. When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession<sup>21</sup>

Hume asked what impression the notion of necessary connection is derived from.<sup>22</sup> Having observed any instance of causation, Hume could not find any impression which is an impression of necessary connection between cause and effect. What is found there are contiguity and succession.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, Hume asked himself about the possibility of knowing that there are necessary connections among objects. Since Hume could not find an impression of necessary connection between cause and effect, he had to give up the direct answer for the question of what the nature of necessary connection is. The possibility that there is necessary connection among objects was left undecided. Necessary connection is neither observable property nor observable relation. Then Hume turned himself to try to examine the evidence for the causal maxim 'Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence'. Hume made a round about and asked the first question:

(Q<sub>1</sub>) First, for what reason we pronounce it necessary, that every thing whose existence has a beginning, should also have a cause? <sup>26</sup>

It had been thought that the causal maxim is intuitively or demonstratively certain. However, Hume thought that the traditional way of understanding this causal maxim is wrong. Hume maintained that this maxim could not be known on the basis of intuition and could not be demonstrated by any argument. If it were demonstratively true that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence, it would be impossible for

something to begin to exist without a cause.

However, Hume maintained that it is not impossible for something to begin to exist without a cause. Whatever objects are distinguishable are separable. Whatever objects are separable are different. So one can distinguish and separate the idea of an object *e* from the idea of an object *c*. What one can conceive is possible to exist.<sup>24</sup> So it is possible for an object *e* to exist independently from an object *c*. If objects are necessarily connected, it is not possible for an object *e* to exist independently from an object *c*. Thus, no objects are necessarily connected. Hume's argument is based on the separability principle. If the notion of necessity of a cause is 'not from knowledge' the notion of necessity of a cause must come from experience.<sup>25</sup> Why do we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects? Hume's concern was directed to the second question:

(Q<sub>2</sub>) Secondly, why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects; and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other, and of the belief we response in it?<sup>26</sup>

If the notion of necessity of a cause is from 'observation and experience', how do observation and experience give rise to the notion of necessity of a cause? How does one conclude that such particular causes necessarily have such particular effects? And how does one draw an inference from one to the other?

We have the notion of necessary connection. Having the notion of necessary connection is a natural fact of human nature. Nevertheless, necessary connection cannot be inferred deductively. And the notion of necessary connection does not have a corresponding impression in the external world. That is, necessary connection cannot be perceived by sense. If we do not find any impression corresponding to the notion of necessary connection, how can we get the notion of necessary connection? Hume explained as follows:

After we have observ'd the resemblance in sufficient number of instances, we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from an object to its usual attendant<sup>27</sup>

Hume denied that necessary connection has an external impression, but did not deny that necessary connection has an internal impression. Necessary connection is something that exists in the mind, namely, an internal impression of the mind. For Hume, necessary connection is 'nothing but an internal impression of the mind or a determination to carry out thoughts from one object to another'. That is to say, necessary connection is something that is felt in the mind. It is the feeling of being determined to pass from one object to its usual attendant.<sup>28</sup> That is, necessary connection is derived from a kind of feeling of the determination of the mind to pass from one object to another. It is not something that is perceived in the external world. Hume regarded the determination of the mind as a natural fact of the human mind. When one observes constant conjunction, the mind operates in a determinate way.<sup>29</sup> Hume claimed that the notion of necessary connection is the product of the determination of the mind.

According to Hume, the human mind has a disposition to spread itself on external objects. Necessary connection is derived from a disposition of the mind. The mind has a disposition to objectify something inside itself to outside. The objectifying function of the disposition of the mind gives rise to the notion of necessary connection. What is objectified by the disposition is the mental activity, i. e., the determination of the mind.

According to Hume, the experience of constant conjunction makes us expect causal relation. Constant conjunction gives rise to the inference from the one to the other. The inference is based on experiencing constant conjunction. This is the reason why one is able to make an inference from one object to another object.

Nevertheless, the operation of the objects is an objective phenomenon. The determination of the mind is a subjective phenomenon. So, it follows that Hume could make no necessary connection in the objective, physical world, but could discover necessary connection in the subjective, mental world. Therefore, the negative aspect of Hume's theory of causation is the answer to (Q<sub>1</sub>) . The positive aspect of Hume's theory of causation is the answer to (Q<sub>2</sub>) .

Thus, the negative aspect of causality depends upon the positive aspect of

causality. The objective depends upon the subjective. The physical depends upon the mental. Then the positive aspect must depend upon the negative aspect. The subject must depend upon the object. The mental must depend upon the physical. Moreover, no necessary connection turns into necessary connection. Again, necessary connection can turn into no necessary connection.

There is a symbolic poem of non-being and being:

Shizukasa ya	Quietness—
Iwani shimiiru	Sinking into the rocks,
Semino koe	A cicada's cry <sup>30</sup>

Although cicada's chirps are noisy, cicada's chirps make one feel the quietness. Noisiness and quietness can exist simultaneously. Form (<sup>noisiness</sup><sub>being</sub>) is emptiness (<sup>quietness</sup><sub>non-being</sub>). emptiness (<sup>quietness</sup><sub>non-being</sub>) is form (<sup>noisiness</sup><sub>being</sub>). Form and emptiness are interdependent and interchangeable. Noisiness and quietness are interdependent and interchangeable. Non-being and being are interdependent and interchangeable. Therefore, no-necessary connection and necessary connection are interdependent and interchangeable.

### Section III: Does Necessity—in—objects not exist?

As has been already mentioned, interdependence between the physical and the mental, i.e., the objective and the subjective could be found in Hume's assertion. Hume's theory of causation requires that necessity—in—mind must be supported by

necessity—in—objects, that is, the mental or the subjective must be supported by the physical or the objective.

It seems to be widely agreed that causation in the relations of facts is nothing other than habitual probability. However, necessity—in—mind cannot be presupposed by habitual probability, because habit cannot have any necessity.

In order to establish necessity—in—objects, firstly, it must be demonstrated that necessity involved in the relation of facts is not reduced to be habitual probability, but reduced to the possibility that something known *a posteriori* can be necessary. Secondly, there must be a textually—based reason for this necessity—in—objects.

As is well known as Hume's Fork, Hume classified the types of relation in two ways. Some truths depend upon the ideas and state relations between the ideas. These are relations of ideas. Some truths do not depend upon the ideas. These are relations of facts. This distinction employed by Hume corresponds to the traditional distinction between necessary and contingent propositions.<sup>31</sup>

The relations of ideas can be discovered in two ways; by intuition and by demonstration. Two is half four. Here one can consider two ideas. The judgement 'the internal angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles' belongs to the relation of ideas. The relation between two ideas can be known by the comparison of the ideas.

On the other hand the relation of facts can be discovered in two ways; by observation and inference. The relation of facts does not depend upon the consideration of the ideas. The propositions concerning the relation of ideas are intuitively certain or demonstratively certain. The propositions concerning the relation of facts are not certain.<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, Hume considered that the propositions concerning the relation of ideas are necessary and the propositions concerning the relation of facts are contingent.

Here the question of whether or not a proposition concerning the relation of objects is necessary will arise.

The notion of necessity in the relation of ideas does not have a corresponding impression. Nevertheless, a proposition concerning the relation of ideas is a necessary one and has a true meaning. What has a true meaning is one thing. What has a corresponding impression is another thing. So, what has a true meaning need not always have a corresponding impression. The notion of necessity in the relation of ideas does not have a corresponding impression. Therefore, even if a proposition concerning the relation of objects does not have a corresponding impression, a proposition concerning the

relation of objects can be a necessary one and can have a true meaning.

Since Hume's distinction can be considered to formulate the classification between necessary propositions and contingent propositions, this distinction coincides with the dichotomy between necessary – *a priori* and contingent – *a posteriori*. the propositions which can be known *a priori* are necessary.<sup>33</sup> The propositions which cannot be known *a priori* are not necessary.

Here the question of whether or not the determination of the mind is *a priori* will arise. We experience a constant conjunction between an object *c* and an object *e*. One thinks of an event *e* whenever an event *c* occurs. Hume tried to explain how our ideas are associated in our mind. When one experiences a constant conjunction, one associates the ideas. The act of association is done in the mind. Whenever one gets an idea of an object *c*, one associates an idea of an object *e* with an idea of an object *c*. The notion of necessity is derived from the mental process of association of two ideas. The mental process of association is an empirical fact. To experience a constant conjunction and associate the ideas is not *a priori*.

However, the question of whether or not something is necessary is one thing. The question of whether or not something can be known *a priori* is another thing. So, what is necessary need not always be known *a priori*. It does not follow that what cannot be known *a priori* is not necessary.

Furthermore, although 'The internal angles of a triangle equal two right angles' is a necessary proposition, this necessity in the relation of ideas 'lies only in the act of the understanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas.'<sup>34</sup> The necessity in the relation of objects 'lies in the determination of the mind.'<sup>35</sup> The notion of necessity is derived from the mental process. Not only the necessity in the relation of ideas but also the necessity in the relation of objects can be reduced to the mental activity. So, from Hume's claim, it can be derived that what can be known *a posteriori* can be necessary. Even if something is known *a posteriori*, something can be necessary. The association, i. e., the relation between two ideas can be necessary. Therefore something known *a posteriori* can be necessary. The necessity in the relation of objects must not be reduced to habitual probability<sup>36</sup>, but must be reduced to the possibility that something known *a posteriori* can be necessary.

Hume's official theory of causation is based on the determination of the mind. That is, necessity is mental. However, we have already found interdependency between



the mental and the physical in Hume's assertion. So, necessity—in—mind must be supported by necessity—in—objects.

In the second place, let us examine some textual evidence for necessity—in—objects.

Hume often talked of the word 'force' and 'energy'.

the very *force* or *energy* of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect.<sup>37</sup>

The words 'force' or 'energy' are used to refer to something in nature. Hume believed in something like causal power. Hume wrote about power:

The secret *power* by which the one object produces the other.<sup>38</sup>

The word 'power' is designated to necessity in nature. Hume's commitment to necessity in nature can be seen:

the scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the *power* or *force*, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body.<sup>39</sup>

Hume committed himself to the existence of necessity in nature. He took it for granted that there is causal force in nature. Then necessity in nature has to be taken into consideration:

We are ignorant of those *powers* and *forces*, on which regular course and succession of objects totally depends.<sup>40</sup>

Nevertheless, regular course and succession of objects depends upon powers and forces. On this point Hume was clear. It would be odd if Hume thought that powers and forces did not exist.

Nature has kept us at great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those *powers* and principles on which the influence of these objects entirely depends.<sup>41</sup>

Nevertheless, the influence of these objects depends upon powers and principles. These 'powers' and 'forces' are synonymous to necessity in nature. Hume never doubted that these powers and principles exist.

Experience only teaches us, has one event constantly follows another; without instructing us

in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.<sup>42</sup>

It never occurred to him to question the existence of causal power. Hume had to describe the way nature operates itself.

Certainly, Hume was not concerned to argue that there is necessity in nature. He insisted on the epistemological claim that we know nothing about the nature of 'force'.<sup>43</sup> Also he was not going to claim that we can know that there is nothing like causal force in nature. The ultimate nature of objects is not only unknown but also unknowable.<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, it never occurred to Hume to doubt the idea that there is necessity in nature.<sup>45</sup> These quotations are some textual evidence for necessity—in-objects.

Necessity—in-objects and necessity—in-mind are interdependent, complementary and interchangeable.

In the words of Russell, Hume 'represents, in a certain sense, a dead end'. The end is the end so far as a sort of dualism is taken. Nevertheless, the end is the beginning. Hume's philosophy will begin with the logic of interdependency.

## NOTES

1. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: George Allen Unwin LTD, 1969) p.634.
2. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) p.70.
3. *The Sacred Books of the East* ed. F. Max Müller, the text of Taoism, VOL. XXX-IX, p.48.

Cf. Lao Tsu. *Tao Te Ching*, tr. D. C. Lan (England: Penguin classics, 1984) pp.42–3.  
"Thus Something and Nothing produce each other; The difficult and the easy complement each other; The long and the short off-set each other; The high and the low incline towards each other; Note and sound harmonize with each other; Before

and after follow each other.”

4. Cf. T. P. Kasulis, *Zen Action Zen Person* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981) p.38. ‘Mu’ (in Japanese) is commonly translated as ‘Non-being’ to suggest the ontological dimension of Taoism.
5. Wing-Tsit Chan, *Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973) p.24. Yin is negative. Yan is positive. All things are products of two things. Reality is a pair of opposites.
6. Cf. *Chuang Tzu* tr. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964) p. 6. “Man becomes one with Nature, or Heavens, ” and “merges himself with Tao, or the Way, the underlying unity that embraces man, Nature.”
7. Nishida’s work is recognized as constituting the first original Japanese philosophy of modern Japan.  
In *A Study of Good* (Tokyo: Japanese Government Printing Bureau, 1960) p. 1 – 2. Nishida formulated the concept of ‘pure experience’ which he sees prior to all positions, such as those of subject and object, body and mind, and spirit and matter. “When one experiences directly one’s conscious state there is as yet neither subject nor object……. This is the purest form of experience……True, pure experience can exist only in present consciousness of events as they are without attaching any meaning to them at all.” The concept of pure experience is expounded here as it is beyond the dichotomy of subject and object. It is significant to note that his idea of the true reality overcomes the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity.
8. Robert E. Carter, *the Nothingness beyond God: an introduction to the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro* (New York: Paragon House, 1989) p.62.
9. Kitaro Nishida, *Fundamental Problems of Philosophy*. Tr. with Intro. by D. A. Dilworth (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1970) p.246.
10. R. H. Robinson W. L. Johnson, *the Buddhist Religion* (Belmont, Calif: Wardworth Inc. 1982) p.69. Prajñā Pāramitā means literally ‘the wisdom that leads to the other-shore’ and is perfection of wisdom.  
Sūtras mean literally ‘a thread on which jewels are strung’ and are the Buddhist scriptures.
11. *The Sacred Books of the East* ed. F. Max Müller, Buddhist Mahāyāna texts

VOL. XLIX p.147–49.

12. Philip Kaplean, *The Three Pillars of Zen* ( Garden City, New York: Anchor Press / Doubleday, 1980) p.374. On oneness, “When you have kensho, you see into the world of oneness.”  
“As you continue your practice on subsequent koans, your awerness of the world of oneness, of non–diffrentiation, becomes clearer.”
13. Thomas Hoover, *The Zen Experience* ( New York: The New American Library, Inc, 1980) p. 3 . It is important to note that the understanding of a truth and the truth itself cannot be separated.
14. James W. Cornman, *Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation* philosophical Studies in Philosophy VOL18. ( London, Boston: D. REIDEL Publishing Company, 1980) p.xv. J. W. Cornman considers that Hume was not an ontological nihilist or skeptic.
15. *Treatise* p.170.
16. *Ibid.* p.170.
17. *Ibid.* p.94.
18. J. A Robinson argues that only the first definition defines the causal relation and is a philosophical analysis. On the other hand, the second definition is a statement of a psychological theory. According to J. A. Robinson, Hume mistakenly described the second as a definition. He maintains that Hume’s first definition is independent of any associations of ideas which may or may not exist in human minds.
19. *Treatise.* p.169–170.
20. *Ibid.* p.79.
21. *Ibid.* p.77.
22. Farhang Zabeeh, *Hume: Precursor of Modern Empiricism* ( Martinus Nighoff / The Hague, 1973) p.25. The principle of the priority of impressions to ideas functions in Hume’s work as a razor which cuts the significant concepts from the meaningless ones.
23. Hume applied the experimental method used by natural sciences to the human mind. Hume’s enthusiasm for the experimental method was inspired by Sir Isaac Newton’s work. His claim appeared in the sub–title of the *Treatise: An Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*. Empirical facts are discovered by examining things; Facts of reflection are discovered by ex-

amining ideas. Chemists analysed water, and found that it is H<sub>2</sub>O. Hume analysed the causation, and found that it implies contiguity, succession and constant conjunction.

24. In this respect, we see a point of difference between Berkeley and Hume. Cf. George Berkeley, *A treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. (New York: Bobbs–Merrill, 1957) p.24. For Berkeley, to be is to be perceived. All things exist only in the minds of God.
25. Cf. Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, edited by N. Kemp Smith, Oxford, 1935, p.176. The same principle is expressed in a different way. "Our ideas reach no further than our experience" and, "Every event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible, and every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible."
26. *Treatise* p.78.
27. *Ibid.* p.165.
28. Barry Stroud, *Hume* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990) p.85. Stroud argues that necessary connection is the feeling of the determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant. "The impression or feeling of determination from which the idea of necessity is derived must therefore be understood as just a certain feeling that arises in the mind whenever a certain kind mental occurrence causes another."
29. A.J.Ayer, *Hume* (Oxford University Press, reprinted 1990) Ayer describes that Hume's theory is that "the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of matters of fact of recurring types gives rise to a mental habit or custom of expecting this regularity to be repeated." Cf. *A Treatise of Human Nature* ed. with an introduction by D. G. C. Macnabb (Fontana Philosophy classics, Fontana / Collins). Macnabb points out that it is this "customary determination of the mind" that we refer to when we talk of the necessary connection between cause and effect.
30. *Matuo Bashō* by Makoto Ueda (Tokyo: Kodansha International LTD, 1982) p.52.
31. This distinction is substantially the same as that between truth of reason and truth of fact in Leibniz.
32. According to Hume, the relation of ideas is regarded as what can be known *a priori*. The relation of objects is not regarded what can be known *a priori*.

33. Kant asserted that there is a relationship between the notion of necessity and the notion of apriority. The notion of apriority distinguishes what is necessary from what is not. Apriority and necessity are equivalent notion.
34. *Treatise*. p.166.
35. *Ibid.* p.166.
36. Peter H. Hare and Edward H. Madden, *Causing, Perceiving and Believing* (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975) p.21. Hare & Madden consider that Hume interpretes the meaning of 'cause' as 'constant conjunction.'
37. *Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. by L. A. Selby— Bigge (Oxford University Press, 1990) p.69.
38. *Ibid.* p.42.
39. *Ibid.* p.63—4.
40. *Ibid.* p.55.
41. *Ibid.* p.32—3.
42. *Ibid.* p.66.
43. *Hume* edited with a new introduction, by Antony Flew (New York; Collier Books, 1962) p.10. It is philosophically important that Hume is eager to put his findings to work as the foundation for a positive agnosticism.
44. Kant followed Hume in denying that metaphysics can demonstrate truths about the universe.
45. Cf. C. J. Ducasse, *Truth, Knowledge and Causation* (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968) p. 8 . In this regard, Ducasse insists upon the fact that we are aware of causal necessity and perceive the causal relations.